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I. Introduction
Legal systems have traditionally treated Family Law as different
from other legal areas because of its attachment to culture.1 For a
long time, the law was not the space to intervene in the intimate
affairs of the family, leaving women and children mostly outside
the scope of legal protection. A clear example of this legal void was
domestic violence, a concept that did not exist and a space which
legal systems consistently claimed too intimate for public
intervention.2 Judges have too often interpreted the rights to privacy
and family as sanctuary spaces, where governments should not
intervene, even to the detriment of some families and some family
members.3 Since its origins, modern international human rights law
included the right to family as inherent to each individual.4 This

1 Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law:
Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP.
L. 753, 754 (2010).
2 See Reva B. Siegel, Civil Rights Reform in Historical Perspective: Regulating
Marital Violence, in REDEFINING EQUALITY 29, 29–30 (Neal Devins & Davison M.
Douglas eds., 1997); Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative
and Privacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996). In the continental legal system, under the
influence of the Napoleonic Code, many countries gave husbands legal power over their
wives. Italy was the first country to eliminate this power in 1865, but it maintained the
husband as head of the household. France only eliminated this power in 1938. See
WHITNEY CHADWICK & TIRZA TRUE LATIMER, Becoming Modern: Gender and Sexual
Identity after World War I, in THE MODERN WOMAN REVISITED: PARIS BETWEEN WARS 3,
16 n.16 (2003). One of the last countries to remove the power of the husband over the
wife in Latin America was Chile in 1989. See Law No. 18.802, 23, MAYO 23, 1989, DIARIO
OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
3 Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2170–71 (1996) (“The criminal justice system regulated marital
violence in this “therapeutic” framework for much of the twentieth century. There was no
formal immunity rule as in tort law, but the criminal justice system developed a set of
formal procedures for handling marital violence—which it justified in the discourse of
affective privacy—that provided informal immunity for the conduct in many
circumstances.”).
4 See G.A. Res. 217 A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 73–74 (Dec.
10, 1948) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the
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recognition, however, was not designed to protect individuals from
abuses within the family, and for many years it was not conducive
to the recognition of families outside the heterosexual married
family.
Human rights systems have no specific definition of what type
of family they protect or how to define the family that they intend
to protect.5 Countries who subscribe to human rights instruments
have their own specific visions of the family, and these visions
sometimes clash with the rights these same instruments intend to
protect.6 Even though regional and international treaties refer to the
family as a unit, shielded from arbitrary state and private
intervention, courts and treaty bodies created by those instruments
have slowly recognized that the family is a space where human
rights violations often occur. This realization came through several
cases in areas such as adoption, reproductive rights, custody, and
violence. Additionally, human rights adjudicative bodies have also
started to think of the right to family outside biology and marriage,
recognizing non-heterosexual and gender non-conforming
individuals’ right to family.
This Article argues that the Inter-American System of Human
Rights (IASHR) has contributed to a family system that embraces
gender equality and non-heterosexual and gender non-conforming
families. It argues that the system had, from its inception, an
expansive idea of the family that included associations outside
marriage. This was the basis for a robust development of the
concepts of equality and non-discrimination by the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). Although the IACtHR has only
decided a handful of cases related to the non-heterosexual family,
its rich case law on equality and the right to family is favorable to

right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. Men and women of
full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry
and to found a family. . . . The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society
and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”).
5 See, e.g., Human Rights Council Res. 29/22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/29/22, at 1–
5 (July 3, 2015) (highlighting the UN’s protection of the family without specifically
defining “family”).
6 See, e.g., Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala, Case 11.625, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 28/98, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. at 144 (1997)
(demonstrating Guatemala had subscribed the ACHR and yet its definition of the family
gave the husband authority over the wife when it came to work outside the household).
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family diversity, including marriage equality. The IASHR,
however, must be careful not to fall into the trap of privileging the
married family after so much progress towards family diversity.
This risk is more apparent after the IACtHR issued a 2017 Advisory
Opinion regarding trans rights and same-sex couples that focused
heavily on the regulation of marriage.7
Part II of this Article analyzes the origins and historical
developments of the American Declaration of Human Rights
(ADHR) and the American Convention of Human Rights (ACHR)
vis-à-vis the family.8 It argues that from its origins the ADHR and
the ACHR had the intention to treat married and unmarried families
equally. This section also analyzes the jurisprudence in the area of
children’s rights and equality within the family. Part III describes
the development of the (IASHR) jurisprudence on the rights of
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, trans, and intersex (LGBTI) individuals,
arguing that its focus on family diversity has been instrumental for
the development of the right to equality and non-discrimination.
This section analyzes the Advisory Opinion AO-24/179 on trans
rights and the rights of same-sex couples, arguing that although
favorable to LGBTI rights, it missed the opportunity to stress the
need for strong protection of trans individuals and family diversity
beyond marriage. Part IV presents some reflections about the risks
of focusing too heavily on marriage equality to the detriment of the
most common set of family associations in Latin America: the
unmarried family.

7 See State Obligations Concerning Change of Name, Gender Identity, and Rights
Derived from a Relationship between Same-Sex Couples (Interpretation and Scope of
Articles 1(1), 3, 7, 11(2), 13, 17, 18 and 24, in relation to Article 1, of the American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
No. 24 (Nov. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-24/17].
8 See Organization of American States, American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man, O.A.S. G.A. Res. XXX, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc. 6 rev. 1
(1948) [hereinafter ADHR], available
at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/american-declaration-rights-duties-ofman.pdf [https://perma.cc/UFG9-AZ8K]; see also Organization of American States,
American Convention on Human Rights, “Pact of San Jose,” Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR], available at
https://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/basic3.american%20convention.htm
[https://perma.cc/5ZLC-9Y5W].
9 Advisory Opinion AO-24/17, supra note 7.
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II. Family Diversity as a Human Right
The Inter-American system of Human Rights (ISHR) started to
take shape in 1945 at the Inter-American Conference on Problems
of War and Peace, also known as the Chapultepec Conference.10 At
that time, concepts such as “gender” and “sexuality” were foreign
to legal systems and had not entered the realm of international
human rights.11 It is no accident that the first human rights
instrument in the Americas was called “American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man.”12 Although the American Declaration
of Human Rights included the prohibition of discrimination on the
basis of sex, there were no women drafters.13 Women had their own
international processes in place through the Inter-American
Commission of Women (CIM), which was created in the 1920s with
the task of studying the situation of women in the region.14 Its main
interest was to advance women’s suffrage.15 The CIM has been at
the forefront of advancing women’s rights, including the drafting of
the Belem do Para Convention.16 Despite its great contributions, the
CIM has functioned on a separate track from the IASHR, which
took many years to introduce women’s issues into its analysis and
cases and even more time to think of sexuality in terms of human
rights protections.

10 Robert K. Goldman, History and Action: the Inter-American Human Rights
System and the Role of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 31 HUM. RTS.
Q. 856, 858 (2009) (“The American states began shaping an incipient regional program
for the protection of human rights at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War
and Peace, the so-called Chapultepec Conference, convened in 1945 to consider the
postwar directions of the Inter-American system.”).
11
Terrell Carver, Gender, in POLITICAL CONCEPTS 169 (Richard Bellamy and Andrew
Mason eds., 2003) (“gender” as a concept was only adopted into political theory in the
1970s).
12 ADHR, supra note 8 (emphasis added).
13 See id. art. 2 (“All persons are equal before the law and have the rights and duties
established in this Declaration, without discrimination as to race, sex, language, creed or
any other factor.”).
14 ORGANIZACIÓN DE LOS ESTADOS AMERICANOS, COMISIÓN INTERAMERICANA DE
MUJERES, A Brief History of the Inter-American Commission of Women 1, 1
http://www.oas.org/en/cim/docs/BriefHistory[EN].pdf [https://perma.cc/E6XD-7MAJ].
15 Id. at 4–5 (explaining the “Hemispheric Struggle for Women’s Suffrage” and
CIM’s first goal in extending the vote to women).
16 Id. at 7 (highlighting that in April 1994, a “Special Assembly of CIM delegates”
approved a draft of the Inter-American Convention on Women and Violence that was
adopted by the General Assembly in Pará, Brazil in June 1994).
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A. The Family in the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man was
adopted in Bogotá, Colombia by the Ninth International Conference
of American States in 1948.17 It was the first instrument in the
region aimed at guaranteeing the protection of human rights.18
These events took place two months before the adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.19 Both declarations
provided a framework that, for the next couple of decades, allowed
the drafting of binding instruments at universal and regional levels.
Even though the drafting of the American Declaration took
place almost simultaneously as the drafting of the Universal
Declaration, both documents showed important differences in their
treatment of the family. Whereas the Universal Declaration focused
on the right to marry, the American Declaration was silent on the
topic of marriage and focused exclusively on the right to form a
family.20
The first Committee Draft of the Universal Declaration stated in
Article 13: “Everyone has the right to contract marriage in
accordance with the laws of the State.”21 It is surprising this
statement passed as a right of any kind. The Article openly
recognized this right was subject to unrestricted government
control.22 Country delegates, including the Inter-American Juridical
Committee representing the Americas, suggested the first
addendum to the first Draft, which included an opening paragraph
on autonomy in family formation and a separate reference to
marriage based on equality of husband and wife.23
ADHR, supra note 8.
Goldman, supra note 10, at 859–60.
19 Id. at 859.
20 See ADHR, supra note 8, art. 6 (specifying only the right to a family and its
protection, with no mention of marriage).
21 Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Drafting Comm., Draft Outline of International Bill of
Rights,
U.N.
Doc.
E/CN.4/AC.1/3,
at
6
(1947),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.4/AC.1/3
[https://perma.cc/9A47-5Q85].
22 See id. (emphasizing the language in Article 13 of the right to marriage as “in
accordance with the laws of the State”).
23 Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Drafting Comm., Addendum to Draft Outline of
International Bill of Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3/Add.1 at 98 (1947),
17
18

2019

FAMILY DIVERSITY

323

The Delegates did not adopt this text.24 By the Drafting
Committee’s Second Session, the draft of Article 13 was more
specific. It had more content, although again, the emphasis was on
marriage, with the reference to the family still reading as an
accessory to marriage.25 While maintaining its emphasis on
protecting marriage, the final version of what became Article 16 of
the Universal Declaration included a reference to the family as the
basic structure of society:
(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due
to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and
to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to
marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full
consent of the intending spouses.
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of
society and is entitled to protection by society and the
State.26
The American Declaration, unlike the Universal Declaration,
focused exclusively on protecting the family:
Article V. Every person has the right to the protection of the
law against abusive attacks upon his honor, his reputation,
and his private and family life.27
Article VI. Every person has the right to establish a family,
the basic element of society, and to receive protection
therefore.28
Both declarations recognized, as part of the basic human rights
canon, the right to form a family. According to Johannes Morsink,
the Universal Declaration’s emphasis on marriage seems to have

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.4/AC.1/3/Add.1
[https://perma.cc/7LG5-KT7X] (“Every person has the right to be free from interference
in his family relations. . . . [i]t is the duty of the State to respect and to protect the reciprocal
rights of husband and wife on their mutual relations.”).
24 Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Drafting Comm., Report of the Drafting Committee to the
Commission
on
Human
Rights,
E/CN.4/95
at
8
(1948)
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.4/95
[https://perma.cc/7BS8-5ULE].
25 Id.
26 See UDHR, supra note 4.
27
Id. art. 5.
28 ADHR, supra note 8, art. 6.
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had at least three motivations.29 First, an opposition to Nazi ideas
that denied interracial marriage;30 second, a discussion about the
role of marriage in family formation;31 and third, the need for
compromise about the place of divorce in the Declaration.32
Divorce was a point of conflict between groups with strong
Christian beliefs and delegations representing secular interests.33
While the first group viewed marriage as an institution without
dissolution, the second group considered it important to treat
marriage as a secular institution subject to divorce laws.34
The recognition of family units formed outside marriage was a
point of disagreement. The Lebanese delegate’s proposal illustrates
the tension: “The family deriving from marriage is the natural and
fundamental group unit of society. It is endowed by the Creator
with inalienable rights antecedent to all positive law . . . .”35
Similarly, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics “thought there was no purpose in laying down that the
family was based on marriage because it could hardly be based upon
anything else.”36 Although no delegate was advocating for a broad
interpretation of the family outside marriage, some were concerned
with guaranteeing equal treatment of children born within or outside
marriage, indirectly recognizing the existence of the family outside
marriage.37 In line with the lack of representation of sexual diversity
at the time, the drafters did not have a family outside heterosexual
norms in mind. According to Morsink, however, at least one
delegate, from Uruguay, stated that omitting references to marriage

29 JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ORIGINS,
DRAFTING AND INTENT (1999).
30 See id. at 88 (“The stipulation that ‘marriage shall be entered into only with the
free and full consent of the intending spouses’ was meant to cut out the role of both religion
and the state and stands in clear contrast to Hitler’s pronouncements in Mein Kampf, where
he denied that marriage was ‘the holiest of human rights.’”).
31 See id. at 254.
32 See id. at 121–122.
33 See id. at 121–125.
34 See id.
35 MORSINK, supra note 29, at 284.
36 See U.N. Economic and Social Council, 2nd Sess., 38th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.38
(May
18,
1948),
http://hrtravaux.law.virginia.edu/document/iccpr/ecn4ac1sr38/nid-1689 [https://perma.cc/33JAV5B7].
37 Id. at 10.
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could provide protection to those “whose sexual inclination is not
heterosexual.”38
Contrary to the drafting of the Universal Declaration, the
drafters of the American Declaration did not discuss the right to
marriage.39 Additionally, the American Declaration included a
special protection for pregnant women and children consistent with
labor protections at the time of drafting.40
B. The Family in the American Convention of Human Rights
The American Convention of Human Rights (ACHR) was
adopted in 1969, and it entered into force in 1978.41 The Convention
resembled the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) that had been drafted three years earlier, and the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, better known as the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR), drafted in 1950 and in force since 1953.42
The ACHR, similar to the ICCPR and the ECHR, refers to the
family in two dimensions. The first dimension is within the right to
privacy and reflects the traditional idea of the family as shielded
from state intervention. The ACHR states in Article 11.2 that “[n]o
one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his
private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of
unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation.”43 This Article is

MORSINK, supra note 29, at 256.
39 Alvaro Paúl, Los Trabajos Preparatorios de la Declaración Americana de los
Derechos y Deberes del Hombre y del Origen Remoto de la Corte Interamericana, XXV
(2017), available at https://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/bjv/detalle-libro/4660-los-trabajospreparatorios-de-la-declaracion-americana-de-los-derechos-y-deberes-del-hombre-y-elorigen-remoto-de-la-corte-interamericana [https://perma.cc/6TB6-Y4KZ].
40 See, e.g., Elizabeth Hutchison, “La Defensa de las “Hijas del Pueblo,” in
DISCIPLINA Y DESACATO: CONSTRUCCION DE IDENTIDAD EN CHILE, SIGLOS XIX Y XX 266
(Lorena Godoy et al. eds., 1995); see also FERNANDO ORTIZ LETELIER, EL MOVIMIENTO
OBRERO EN CHILE (1891-1919) 147 (2005).
41 Cecilia Medina Quiroga, Los 40 años de la Convención Americana sobre
Derechos Humanos a la luz de cierta jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana, ANUARIO
DE
DERECHOS
HUMANOS
15
(2009),
http://repositorio.uchile.cl/bitstream/handle/2250/126735/los-40-anos-de-la-convencionamericana-sobre-derechos-humanos-a-la-luz-de-cierta-jurisprudencia-de-la-CorteInternacional.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/7GF9-M7UG].
42 Id. at 16.
43 ACHR, supra note 8, at art. 11.2.
38
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similar to ICCPR’s Article 17.44 The second dimension refers to the
right to form a family.45 Article 17 of the ACHR and Article 23 of
the ICCPR are very similar. Both texts recognized the family as the
natural and fundamental unit in society with no mention of
marriage.46 Both referred to the right of men and women to marry
and form a family.47 The ACHR uses, in English, the sentence “to
raise a family” while the ICCPR uses “to found a family.” Both
documents in Spanish, however, use the same sentence “a fundar
una familia.”48 The ACHR, however, added paragraphs that
resulted in a more robust protection to the family and the basis for
case law strengthening the protection of families outside the
heterosexual married couple.49
The ACHR, added two elements not included in the ICCPR.
First, it conditioned legal regulations for the celebration of marriage
to the principle of non-discrimination, and it provided a condition
of equality within marriage to get the protection of the Convention.50
It also covered more types of families than the text of the ICCPR.51
Additionally, the American Convention protects the right of women
and men to marry and the right to found a family under the
conditions set forth in their own countries.52 These rights, however,
are protected as long as those conditions do not go against the
Convention’s principle of non-discrimination. Under the ACHR
children also have the same right to family, regardless of their
parents’ marital status.53 The ACHR, therefore, since its origins,
formally protects some family connection outside of the
traditionally married family.
Regarding underage marriage, the Convention did not expressly

44 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966,
999
U.N.T.S.
171
[hereinafter
ICCPR],
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx [https://perma.cc/42LXKDQP].
45 ACHR, supra note 8, at art. 17.
46
See id.; see ICCPR, supra note 44, at art. 23.
47 See ACHR, supra note 8; see ICCPR, supra note 44.
48
ACHR, supra note 8, at art 17.
49
See id.
50 See id.; see Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala, Case 11.625, InterAm. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 4/01, at 7–8 (Jan. 19, 2001).
51 See ACHR, supra note 8, at art. 17.
52 See id. at art. 17.4.
53 See id. at art. 17.5.
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prohibit it, even though the third paragraph of Article 17 states that
marriage could only occur if the parties freely consented to it.54 This
position followed the legal framework of the majority of countries
in Latin America and the world.55 The focus on the prohibition of
underage marriage came some years later, and thanks to other
human rights instruments, the international human rights
community is pushing for eliminating underage marriage.56
Despite its shortcomings, since its origins the ACHR
subordinated marriage regulations and the right to raise a family to
the principle of non-discrimination. This is a key element for the
progressive inclusion and equality of treatment of non-heterosexual
families in the region.
The most important innovation of the American Convention
was the right of children, born out of wedlock, to equal treatment.57
Consistently throughout history, Latin America and the Caribbean
have had low marriage rates and high rates of children born out of
wedlock.58 Unlike the ICCPR and the ECHR, the ACHR clarified
See id. art. 17.
ROCÍO ROSERO GARCÉS & CECILIA VALDIVIESO VEGA, REFORMING THE
LEGISLATION ON THE AGE OF MARRIAGE: SUCCESSFUL EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS
LEARNED
FROM
LATIN
AMERICA
AND
THE
CARIBBEAN
7
(2016),
http://onusidalac.org/1/images/2016/onu-matrimonio-infantil-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AXH3-G99G] (stating 30% of women between the ages of 20 and 49 in
Latin America and the Caribbean were married or entered into a union before the age of
18, while 18% married before the age of 15).
56 See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) art. 16.2, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 20378 (Sept. 3, 1981),
available
at
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/professionalinterest/cedaw.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A3K6-CJFC]; Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, General Recommendation No. 21: Equality in Marriage and Family Relations,
art.
36
(1994),
available
at
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/1_Global/A_49_38
(SUPP)_4733_E.pdf [https://perma.cc/VT3U-CRAN]; Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and Convention on the Rights of the Child,
Joint General Recommendation/General Comment No. 31, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/31CRC/C/GC/18 (Nov. 14, 2014) (stating that in exceptional cases judicial authorities may
approve marriage by minors, provided that they have reached 16 years).
57 See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & ROBERT NORRIS, HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM 14 (1982).
58 Nina Milanich, To Make All Children Equal is a Change in the Power Structures
of Society: The Politics of Family Law in Twentieth Century Chile and Latin America, 33
LAW AND HIST. REV. 767, 774 (2015) (“By the turn of the twentieth century, Latin America
had the lowest marriage rates and highest illegitimacy rates in the world”) (citing GÖRAN
THERBORN, BETWEEN SEX AND POWER: FAMILY IN THE WORLD, 1900–2000 156 (2004))).
54
55
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that treating legitimate and illegitimate children differently violated
the right to family.59 Many years passed before the right to equal
treatment between legitimate and illegitimate children became the
general rule in the region.60 The American Convention, however,
recognized children’s equality, regardless of parents’ civil status, as
a basic human right. The ECHR, on the contrary, had no similar
provision, and it recognized this right through case law in 1979.61
Article 15 of the Additional Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights “Protocol of San Salvador” complements Article 17
of the Convention.62 Additionally, Article 15 states that the family
is the foundation of society and that “everyone has the right to form
a family, which shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions
of the pertinent domestic legislation.”63 Once more, the right to
marry is not mentioned, even though it links the right to family to
local legislations, indirectly creating restrictions to unmarried
families.
C. The Family Through the Jurisprudence of the InterAmerican System of Human Rights
The IACtHR has a rich jurisprudence on the right to privacy
involving the family.64 Several of the IACtHR’s decisions provided
ACHR, supra note 8, at art. 17.
For a historical account on regulation of illegitimacy in Latin America, see
Milanich, supra note 58, at 774 (citing THERBORN, supra note 58).
61 Marckx v. Belgium, App. No. 6833/74, Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 13, 1979), available
at https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,3ae6b7014.html [https://perma.cc/PY8MC8ZL].
62 See Organization of American States, Additional Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
“Protocol of San Salvador” art. 15, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, available at
https://www.oas.org/dil/1988%20Additional%20Protocol%20to%20the%20American%2
0Convention%20on%20Human%20Rights%20in%20the%20Area%20of%20Economic,
%20Social%20and%20Cultural%20Rights%20(Protocol%20of%20San%20Salvador).pd
f [https://perma.cc/9NUK-YSHH].
63 Id.
64 See, e.g., Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, (Nov. 19,
1999); Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130 (Sept. 8,
2005); Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134 (Sept. 15, 2005),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_134_ing.pdf
59
60
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content to the definition of the family unit protected under the
ACHR. Outside the scope of LGBTI rights, there are at least two
areas in which the IACtHR has contributed to shaping family law
institutions in the region. The richest area of development and
perhaps one of the least analyzed is children’s rights. The IACtHR
has also decided several cases related to justice within the family
and cases related to gender equality and the family.
1. Children’s Rights
The most notable actions by the IACtHR in this area are the
Advisory Opinion 17 (OC-17/2002) on children’s rights, and cases
of children separated from their families.65 OC-17/2002 was a
groundbreaking opinion on children’s rights issued by the IACtHR
in 2002 at the request of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights 66 The IACHR asked the Court to interpret Articles 8 and 25
of the American Convention, “with the aim of determining whether
the special measures set forth in Article 19 of that same Convention
establish[ed] ‘limits to the good judgment and discretion of the
States with respect to children . . . .’”67
[https://perma.cc/HD8L-YNX4]; Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148
(July 1, 2006), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_148_ing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XYU7-K5FM]; Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panamá, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193
(Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_193_ing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6RLQ-P5FY]; Case of Escher et al. v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 208 (July 6,
2009),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_200_ing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9Z66-B4YY]; Case of Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 212
(May 25, 2010), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_212_ing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EJL9-N3UK]; Rosendo Cantú et al. v. México, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Cost, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216, (Aug. 31,
2010),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_216_ing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3FFB-BPE4]; Case Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 221 (Feb. 24, 2011),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_221_ing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UB6V-HUQ8].
65 Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion OC-17/02,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 17 (Aug. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC17/02], available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_17_ing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4363-2V3G].
66 Id. at ¶ 1.
67 Id.
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Several interpretations came out of OC-17/2002 with major
implications for the family that would later develop through case
law. In this Opinion, the IACtHR indicated that it was a state’s
obligation “to support the family in performing its natural function
of providing protection to the children who are members of the
family.”68 This mandate does not explain the type of family to be
protected or define “members of the family.”69 OC-17/02 refers to
the family “as a natural and fundamental component of society.”70
It also states that “the child must remain in his or her household,
unless there are determining reasons, based on the child’s best
interests, to decide to separate him or her from the family.”71 This
statement, however, did not shed light on the type of association that
the Court considered a family unit. In 2012, the first case on sexual
orientation, Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile (Atala),72 the
IACtHR broadly interpreted the family unit protected by the ACHR,
including unmarried and non-heterosexual families.73
Other IACtHR decisions reinforce the protection of the singleparent family formed outside marriage. In Forneron and Daughter
v. Argentina,74 the Court stated that being a single parent was not an
impediment to raising a family.75 It stated that “[t]here is nothing to
indicate that single-parent families cannot provide children with
care, support and affection. Every day, the reality shows that not
every family has a maternal or paternal figure, and this does not
prevent the family from providing the necessary well-being for a
child’s development.”76

Id. ¶ 53.
See id.
70 Id. ¶ 66.
71 See Advisory Opinion OC-17/02, supra note 65, ¶ 77.
72 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile (Atala v. Chile), Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 239, (Feb. 24, 2012),
http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_239_ing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F2QJMR3H].
73 See infra Section III.A.
74 Forneron and Daughter v. Argentina (Forneron v. Argentina), Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 242, (Apr. 27, 2012), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_242_ing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DCD2-N5QS].
75 See id. ¶ 96.
76 Id. ¶ 98.
68
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2. Fighting Patriarchal Family Structures
The ACHR is the first line of defense against the patriarchal
family. Article 17.4 states that countries must take measures to
ensure equality of rights between spouses in marriage.77 Outside
marriage, however, there is no express mandate for families to
enforce principles of equality and non-discrimination within the
family.78 Thus, the family could be, and often is, a space for human
rights violations. There is, however, enough case law from the
IACtHR and reports from the IACHR to state that the InterAmerican system has contributed to understandings of the family
based on equality among its members. These understandings of
equality within the family do not derive from Article 17 of the
ACHR, but from the right to equal protection recognized in Article
24, and the Obligation to Respect Rights of Article 1.1.79 If a family
structure affects the right to equality of its members, or affects any
other right recognized by the ACHR or other international
instruments, a State Party may be violating its international
obligations.80 Equality within the family, however, requires
fighting structural inequalities that affect women beyond the
confines of the household, including the pervasive use of sexual
violence against women as an instrument of subordination.
The IACHR started functioning in 1959 and in 1965 the OAS
expanded its mandate to include review of individual petitions.81
The IACHR reviewed its first petitions in 1967.82 Even though
women were mentioned as victims in some of the cases, and there

ACHR, supra note 8, at art. 17.4.
Id.
79 Id. at art. 1.1, art. 24.
80 Id. at pmbl.
81 Organization of American States, Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Santiago, Chile, Final Act, Aug. 12-18, 1959, Doc. OEA/Ser. C/VIII,
http://www.oas.org/council/MEETINGS%20OF%20CONSULTATION/Actas/Acta%20
5.pdf [https://perma.cc/86ZC-EAGU]; OAS, Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs, Punta del Este, Uruguay, Final Act, Jan. 22-31, 1962, Doc.
OEA/Ser.C/II.8,
http://www.oas.org/consejo/meetings%20OF%20consultation/actas/acta%208.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LU8Y-FD6J].
82 ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS
STRATEGIC
PLAN
2011-2015
37,
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/pdf/IACHRStrategicPlan20112015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K2QR-HMJ2].
77
78
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were issues that today would be considered gender-specific, for
many years the human rights narrative did not include issues of
gender and sexuality. By the late 1990s, there was some
acknowledgment that governments could be responsible for sexual
violence, but it took until the 2000s for the system to hold
governments accountable for human rights violations against
women.83 Loayza Tamayo v. Peru84 illustrates how difficult it was
for the IACtHR to understand rape as a human rights violation.85 In
that case, the claimant was a woman who had been illegally detained
and tortured by the intelligence police of Peru in 1993.86 This
torture included several instances of rape.87 The Court decided the
case in 1997 and despite having the same evidence about the acts of
torture, including her repeated rape, the Court reached the
conclusion that “after examination of the file and, given the nature
of this fact, the accusation [of rape] could not be substantiated.88
However, the other facts alleged, such as incommunicado
detention, . . . blows and maltreatment, . . . all constitute forms of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment . . . .”89
The IACtHR had the same evidence for all the harms suffered
by Loayza (witness testimonies and the victim’s account), but found
them credible in the case of gender-neutral harms and not credible,
“given the nature of [the] fact,” when it came to rape.90 The IACtHR
did not explain what the nature of the fact was, even though the use
of rape as an instrument of torture against women was well known
then, even though less analyzed and theorized than now.91

83 Raquel Martin de Mejía v. Perú, Case 10.970, Inter-Am. Commission H.R., Report
No. 5/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, doc. 7, at 168 (1996), available at
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/cases/1996/peru5-96.htm
[https://perma.cc/D8PP-JVUN]
(acknowledging that rape could be a form of torture).
84 Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R.
(ser.
C)
No.
33,
(Sept.
17,
1997),
available
at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_33_ing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DK3D-24F4].
85 Id.
86 Id. ¶ 3.
87 Id.
88
Id.
89 Id. ¶ 58 (emphasis added).
90 See Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, at id.
91 See Patricia Palacios Zuloaga, The Path to Gender Justice in the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 227, 236 (2008).
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Two of the first reports on merits issued by the Inter-American
Commission specific to women’s harms were Maria Eugenia
Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala92 and Maria da Penha v. Brazil;93
both occurred in 2001. The first case was a challenge to
Guatemala’s Civil Code, which gave a husband the right to
authorize or deny his wife permission to work outside the house
when he provided enough income and had “sufficiently justified
reasons.”94 Guatemala’s Constitutional Court had found the legal
provision constitutional, based on the need to protect “the wife in
her role as mother, and protect the children.”95 The IACHR stated
that the legal consequence of the provision was “to deny married
women their legal autonomy.”96
The second case conceptualized domestic violence as a human
rights violation and the IACHR, for the first time, used the InterAmerican Convention on The Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence Against Women (Convention of Belem do
Para).97 The result in Maria da Penha v. Brazil98 marks the moment
when the IASHR started to develop human rights standards
regarding violence and discrimination against women.99 It also
initiated the practice of holding governments accountable for the
lack of effective response to gender-based violence. The case
triggered the passing of a new domestic violence statute in Brazil
named after the petitioner in the case.100
After these cases, which marked the first time the Inter-

92 Maria Eugenia Morales De Sierra Guatemala v. Guatemala (Morales v.
Guatemala), Inter-Am. Commission H.R., Report No. 28/98, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6
rev. (2001).
93 Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
54/01, OEASer.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev 704 (2001).
94 See Morales v. Guatemala, ¶ 28.
95 Id. ¶ 35.
96 Id. ¶ 38.
97 Paula Spieler, The Maria da Penha Case and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights: Contributions to the Debate on Domestic Violence Against Women in
Brazil, 18 IND. J. OF GLOB. LEGAL STUD., 1, 122 (2011).
98 See Maria da Penha v. Brazil.
99 See id.
100 On August 7, 2006, Brazil passed Law 11.340, better known as “ley Maria da
Penha.” See Pablo Uchoa, Maria da Penha: The woman who changed Brazil’s domestic
violence laws, BBC BRASIL (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine37429051 [https://perma.cc/JRV9-4LRG].
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American system analyzed human rights thinking of harms suffered
specifically by women, both the Commission and the Court
developed a nuanced understanding of the role that gender
stereotypes play in human rights violations. In González et al.
(“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico,101 the IACtHR not only referred to the
structural issue of violence against women but also introduced the
concept of gender stereotyping in the Inter-American system.102 In
that decision, the IACtHR talked about inequality between men and
women and referred to the problem of subordination of women.103
It also stated that “[t]he creation and use of stereotypes becomes one
of the causes and consequences of gender-based violence against
women.”104 After Cotton Field the Inter-American system has often
analyzed the role that gender stereotypes play in cases of violence
and discrimination against women.105
The Inter-American Commission came to a similar conclusion
in Jessica Lenahan (Gonzalez) et.al. v. United States.106 There, the
obligation to take measures to prevent domestic violence derived
from the American Declaration, but the reasoning in both Merits
Reports was very similar.107
These reports were the beginning of a new era in the relationship
between the family and human rights. They confirmed there is no
area of human behavior shielded from a human rights framework.108
They also clarified that international obligations required more than
just the commitment to do no harm from countries.109 This is
instrumental for gender equality, especially within the family, as it

101 González et al. v. Mexico (“Cotton Field”), Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 205 (Nov. 16, 2009).
102 Id. ¶¶ 401–402.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 See e.g., Artavia Murillo et al. (“in vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257
(Nov. 28, 2012); see also Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile (Atala v. Chile), Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 24, 2012).
106 Lenahan (Gonzalez) et al. v. United States, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 80/11 (July 21, 2011).
107 Id.
108 See id.; see also González et al. v. Mexico (“Cotton Field”), Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 205
(Nov. 16, 2009).
109 See id.
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forces countries to face domestic violence as not a private problem,
but a structural issue partly due to impunity and an ineffective
response by the justice system. Although even at a slower pace than
the IASHR, the European system has responded in a similar manner
to domestic violence, with its first decision on the topic in 2008.110
III. LGBTI Rights Enter the Inter-American System of
Human Rights
In the 1980s and 1990s, the European system of Human Rights
analyzed cases regarding both sexual orientation111 and gender
identity (SOGI).112 The IASHR, on the contrary, did not decide any
cases related to violence or discrimination based on SOGI until
2010, when the IACHR issued its report against Chile for the
discrimination of Judge Karen Atala and her daughters based on her
sexual orientation.113 Two years later, the IACtHR decided in favor
of Judge Atala, declaring sexual orientation and gender identity
protected categories under the ACHR.114 The rights of LGBTI
individuals became a core part of the system in 2011, when the
IACHR created a special unit to strengthen the Commission’s
capacity to protect LGBTI rights.115 In 2014, the IACHR created a
Rapporteurship on LGBTI right.116
110 See Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 71127/01, 2008 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on
H.R. 44 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
111 See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 149 (ser. B) (1982); Norris v.
Ireland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 186 (1988); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 EUR. CT. OF HUM RTS. (ser.
A) (1993). See Homosexuality: Criminal Aspects Factsheet, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS
(2014),
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Homosexuality_ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5UVS-4MSN].
112 Regarding gender identity, the first case was Rees v. United Kingdom and it was
decided against the plaintiff in 1986. The first successful case for a plaintiff on issues of
gender identity came in 2002, in Goodwin v. United Kingdom. See Gender Identity Issues
Factsheet,
EUROPEAN
COURT
OF
HUMAN
RIGHTS
(2018),
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Gender_identity_ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9CS2-UN58]; see also Sexual Orientation Issues Factsheet, EUR. CT. OF
HUM RTS. (2018), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Sexual_orientation_ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/39LY-T4BN].
113 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile (Atala v. Chile), Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 239, (Feb. 24, 2012).
114 Id.
115 See Rapporteurship on the Rights of LGBTI Persons, ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN
STATES
(2011),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/lgtbi/default.asp
[https://perma.cc/FG84-M4FQ].
116 See id.
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A. The First Cases on LGBT Rights and the Family
Atala117 is the groundbreaking case on sexual orientation before
the Inter-American system. The decision indirectly contributed to
developing a new understanding of the family from an InterAmerican human rights framework. It was not about Judge Atala
and her right to be with her children but about the children and their
right to be with their mother, and not with a mother that fit imposed
standards of motherhood.118 This reasoning is not just about samesex couples, but non-traditional families in general. Its reasoning
can also extend to protecting the rights of parents who do not fit the
stereotypical roles of mother and father from gender, socioeconomic, cultural, and religious perspectives. One of the main
problems of the best interest of the child principle is that it invites
judges to compare a child’s reality with an ideal scenario that few
are in position to provide.119 Thus, single parents in low socioeconomic environments are measured against an unrealistic
standard. Equally, a mother that does not fit the ideal preconceived
notions of motherhood may suffer from discrimination—hidden
under the malleable principle of the best interest of the child.
In Atala, the Supreme Court of Chile (SCC) used the best
interest of the child principle to discriminate against a mother who
did not fit the majority of the SCC justices’ definition of the “good
mother.”120 In 2002, Ms. Atala separated from her husband and
assumed her sexual orientation.121 The husband and Ms. Atala
agreed that she would live with their three young children, and he
would visit them regularly.122 This arrangement lasted until Ms.
Atala fell in love with a woman who moved into Ms. Atala’s
house.123 The father filed for custody of the three girls.124 According
to the Supreme Court’s decision, the father argued that “the decision
adopted by the mother following her homosexual tendency harms
See Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239.
118 See id.
119 See e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child
Custody: The Puzzling Persistence of the Best-Interests Standard, 77 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 69, 71–72 (2014).
120 See Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239.
121 Id. ¶ 30.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. ¶ 31.
117
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the psychical integral development and social environment of the
three minors; that the interest of her daughters makes necessary to
preempt the pernicious consequences that being raised under the
care of a homosexual partner will trigger.”125 The claim was not
that Ms. Atala or her partner were directly harming the girls. The
argument was simply that a lesbian woman had to choose between
being a mother and being lesbian, as if motherhood was essentially
heterosexual.126 This argument resonated with the lower court judge
who granted an injunction to give temporary custody of the girls to
the husband, stating that “the [father] offers more favorable
arguments on behalf of the best interest of the girls, which in the
context of a heterosexual and traditional society take on great
importance.”127
Ms. Atala eventually won the custody battle, but the Supreme
Court overturned the final decision through an extraordinary writ
using similar arguments as the lower court against Ms. Atala.128 The
Court’s decision to separate the girls from their mother did not relate
to anything Ms. Atala or her partner had done to the children. The
Supreme Court punished Ms. Atala for not conforming to the
specific behavior these judges assigned to the “good mother.” The
SCC stated that by living with a lesbian partner, Ms. Atala had
chosen her own desires over the well-being of her daughters.129 In
the Supreme Court Justices’ opinion, Ms. Atala would have been a
“good mother” by living alone or living with a male partner.130 For
this arbitrary opinion to be legal, they used the principle of the best
interest of the child as a shield.
In Atala, the IACtHR reinforced important principles against the
patriarchal family. First, it confirmed that the ACHR protects not
only the married family but also de facto family ties.131 Second, it
stated that the “the girls’ alleged need to grow up in a ‘normally
structured family that is appreciated within its social environment,’
and not in an ‘exceptional family,’ reflects a limited, stereotyped
perception of the concept of family, which has no basis in the
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Id. ¶ 53.
Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, at id.
Id. ¶ 141.
See id.
Id. ¶ 56.
Id. ¶ 141.
Id. ¶ 142.
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Convention, since there is no specific model of family.”132 Third, it
provided content against the best interest of the child principle,
rejecting the idea that each person using this principle could define
what is best for children according to their own opinions.133 The
IACtHR stated that:
[T]he determination of the child’s best interest in cases involving
the care and custody of minors must be based on an assessment
of specific parental behaviors and their negative impact on the
well-being and development of the child, or of any real and
proven damage or risks to the child’s well-being and not those
that are speculative or imaginary. Therefore, speculations,
assumptions, stereotypes, or generalized considerations regarding
the parents’ personal characteristics or cultural preferences
regarding the family’s traditional concepts are not admissible.134

It is interesting to note that the first cases on sexual orientation
before the European and Universal systems of human rights were
about anti-sodomy statutes.135 Without dismissing the obstacles
faced by the litigants in these cases, they were challenging antisodomy statutes that both the UK and Australia were rarely
enforcing and in places where people did not actively persecute
same-sex couples.136 The Human Rights Committee and the ECHR
decided these cases focusing primarily on the right to privacy,
providing a small opening for gradual changes in both systems.137
The IASHR, instead, had to analyze whether sexual orientation was
a protected category under the ACHR by delving into a family law
case where sexual orientation was the fundamental factor used to
decide the custody of three young children.138 Privacy would not be
enough to argue this case since it required an analysis of the

See Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 145.
Id. ¶ 110.
134 Id.
135 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 149 (ser. B) (1982); Toonen v.
Australia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Apr. 4, 1994).
136 Giulia Dondoli, LGBTI Activism Influencing Foreign Legislation, 16 MELB. J.
INT’L L. 124, 131–34 (2015).
137 See id. at 133.
138 See Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile (Atala v. Chile), Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 239, (Feb. 24, 2012).
132
133
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international law principle of the best interest of the child.139 The
fact that very young children were at the center of the dispute did
not make things easier. This was a difficult “first case” because it
touched on the family, a sphere often considered outside the reach
of legal systems.140 Fortunately, the IACtHR understood that courts
cannot use the best interest of the child as a tool to discriminate
against parents based on their sexual orientation.141 Instead of a
small opening for gradual change, Atala created a wide opening for
sexual orientation human rights litigation. The decision left the
door open to expand the right to family to associations formed
outside the legal marriage, both by heterosexual and same-sex
partners. The Atala case had a domino effect in Latin America, with
local courts citing it as justification for their own decisions
regarding different issues related to sexual orientation and gender
identity, including marriage equality and second parent adoption of
same-sex couples.142
B. The Next Cases: More on the Family and More on
Discrimination
Before 2004, when the Atala case started, there were two
submissions related to sexual orientation. The first petition
regarding sexual orientation was submitted in 1999, but did not have
a Merits Report until 2014.143 Marta Lucía Álvarez Giraldo, a
lesbian woman serving a long prison sentence in Colombia, filed a

See id. ¶ 107.
See Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law:
Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP.
L. 753, 754 (2010).
141 Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 110.
142 See Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 4, 2015,
Sentenica C-683/15, (¶ 8.1.1) (Colom.); Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional
Court], febrero 18, 2015, Sentencia C-071/15, (n.284) (Colomb.); Corte Constitutional
[C.C.] [Constitutional Court], abril 28, 2016, Sentencia SU214/16, (nn.117 & 164)
(Colomb.); Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 28, 2014, Sentencia
SU617/14 (¶ 13) (Colomb.); Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN], Amparo en
Revisión 581/2012, Página 49 (Mex.); Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN],
Amparo en Revisión 704/2014, Página 75 (Mex.); Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación
[SCJN], Amparo en Revision 735/2014; Página 24 (Mex.); Supreme Court of Justice of
Costa Rica, Constitutional Chamber, Exp: 15-013971-0007-CO, Res. Nº 2018012782,
Aug. 8, 2018.
143 Marta Lucia Alvarez Giraldo v. Colombia, Case 11.656, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 71/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3 (1999).
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petition in 1996 arguing that Colombia discriminated against
lesbian inmates by denying them the right to intimate visits that
heterosexual inmates enjoyed.144 From the Merits Report, it seems
that the case was inactive until 2009.145 In 2014, the IACHR Merits
Report concluded that Colombia violated Ms. Alvarez’ rights and
discriminated against her on the basis of her sexual orientation.146
Although the IACHR did not elaborate on the concept of family in
its Merits Report, it was clear that it did not see Ms. Alvarez’ denial
of intimate visits just as a violation of privacy. The IACHR stated
that the right to intimate visits was an essential requirement to
ensure the integrity and freedom of inmates and, as a consequence,
the protection of the right to family.147 This case reinforced the idea
in Atala that the right to family is not tied to heterosexuality or legal
marriage.
In 2002, the IACHR received a petition against Ecuador for the
military discharge of Homero Flor Freire, based on accusations of
engaging in homosexual acts, prohibited by the Ecuadorian
military.148 The IACtHR issued a decision against Ecuador in 2016.
Mr. Flor Freire argued that he had not engaged in “homosexual
conduct.”149 The Court, relying on the standards developed in Atala,
used the case to expand on the concept of anti-discrimination to
include discrimination for the perceived sexual orientation.150 It
also reinforced the prohibition of treating sexual acts between
individuals of the same sex different to acts between individuals of
different sex.151 Equality of treatment should apply in all contexts,
including the military.152
In 2005, the IACHR received a third petition regarding sexual
orientation and the family.153 In this case, Angel Alberto Duque

Id.
Id. ¶ 12.
146 Id. ¶ 180.
147 Id. ¶ 194.
148 Flor Freire v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R, (ser. C) No. 315 (Aug. 31, 2016).
149 See id.
150 Id. ¶¶ 102–103.
151 Id. ¶¶ 116–117.
152 Id. ¶¶ 118-119.
153 See Ángel Alberto Duque v. Colombia, Case 12,841, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 5/14 (2014).
144
145
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claimed that Colombia had denied him a survivor’s pension because
his deceased partner was a man.154 Angel Alberto Duque v.
Colombia155 became the second case on sexual orientation to reach
the IACtHR, and Duque obtained a favorable decision.156 By then,
it was undeniable that the ACHR protected the family—including
those formed by same-sex partners.
In 2012, right after the IACtHR issued its Atala decision, six
same-sex couples supported by an LGBT organization in Chile filed
a petition arguing discrimination due to the lack of marriage
equality in Chile.157 The case ended with a friendly settlement in
which the government of Chile promised to advance in the
recognition of LGBTI rights, supporting a bill on marriage
equality.158 By 2018, the system had not reviewed the merits of any
cases on marriage equality.
Except for the case of Mr. Flor Freire, which expanded the
concept of equality to include discrimination for the perceived
sexual orientation, the cases reviewed by the IASHR have focused
on the right to family diversity.159 The advantage of this line of
cases is that it forced the system to develop a strong antidiscrimination standard, instead of confining LGBTI rights to the
narrower field of privacy. The disadvantage is that the system has
not focused its case law on issues of violence against LGBTI people,
especially trans people. The IACHR received its first case on
violence based on SOGI in 2009.160 The case of Azul Rojas Marin
refers to one of the most common forms of violence against trans
people: police brutality, including sexual violence against a person
targeted for her gender identity.161 The development of standards to
protect individuals from violence based on SOGI is beyond the
Id. ¶ 1.
Id.
156 Id. ¶ 102.
157 Press Release, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Friendly Settlement before
the IACHR Furthers Progress on Marriage Equality in Chile (Feb. 2, 2017), available at
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2017/009.asp
[https://perma.cc/899R-6WLT].
158 Id.
159 See Homero Flor Freire v. Ecuador, Case 12,743, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 81/13 (2013).
160 Luis Alberto Rojas Marin v. Peru, Case 446-09, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 99/14, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.153, doc. 15 ¶ 1 (2014).
161
See id.
154
155
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scope of this Article. There can be, however, no right to family
when people live their lives with the constant fear of being the target
of violence due to their actual or perceived sexual orientation and
gender identity.
C. The IACtHR Advisory Opinion on LGBTI Rights
On May 2016, Costa Rica requested the IACtHR to issue an
Advisory Opinion (AO) regarding the interpretation and reach of
Articles 11.2 (protection of privacy and he family), 18 (right to a
legal name), and 24 (equality) in relation to Article 1 (obligation to
respect rights and principle of non-discrimination) of the ACHR.162
Specifically, Costa Rica requested the IACtHR to elaborate on: (1)
the protection those rights provide to individuals based on their
gender identity; (2) the compatibility of a specific provision of the
Cosa Rican Civil Code with the ACHR when individuals requested
a change of legal name based on their gender identity; and (3) the
protection of the ACHR to property rights (derechos de
propiedades) derived from a same-sex relationship.163
Based on these three main issues, Costa Rica requested the
IACtHR to answer five specific questions.164 Three questions
related to gender identity and access to a procedure to change the
legal name and the last two related to the recognition of property
rights derived of same-sex relations.165
1. Trans Rights and the Family
The Costa Rican government’s questions regarding the
protection of trans individuals were not related to the trans family.166
They targeted the most basic problem trans individuals face around
the world. When trans individuals cannot change their legal name
and identity cards according to their self-perceived gender identity,
they are forced to out themselves as trans and are exposed to
violence and discrimination.167 Trans people have difficulty
Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 7.
Id. ¶ 1.
164 Id. ¶ 3.
165 Id.
166 See id.
167 INTER-AMERICAN COMM’N HUMAN RIGHTS, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL, TRANS AND INTERSEX PERSONS IN THE AMERICAS 34, OAS Doc.
OAS/Ser.L/V/II.rev.1, doc. 36 (Nov. 12, 2015).
162
163
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securing employment or have their political rights violated because
their physical appearance does not match their legal identity.168
Lack of access to the legal identity that matches a person’s gender
identity also has an impact in family formation and the protection
of trans children.169 An accessible, easy, and fast legal name change
process is the starting point to the recognition of trans individuals
as citizens and also as family members.
In the AO, the IACtHR analyzed the right to a person’s gender
identity under the ACHR. It stated that the right to identity
encompasses several rights and it relates to dignity, privacy, and
autonomy.170 The IACtHR added that gender identity is linked to
the concept of liberty and self-determination.171 One of the most
important elements of the AO is the recognition of gender identity
as “the internal and individual gender experience as each individual
feels it, which can correspond or not with the assigned sex at
birth.”172 The recognition of gender identity as an essential aspect
of an individual’s autonomy puts all models of medicalization and
pathologization of gender identity at odds with the ACHR and
should be a strong incentive for countries to end harmful practices
against trans individuals.173 The IACtHR stated that requiring
medical exams or certifications “contributes to perpetuating
prejudices associated to the binary construction of the masculine
and feminine gender.”174
The right to have and to change one’s legal name, therefore, is
directly tied to the right to one’s identity.175 Governments must have
procedures in place that do not hinder a person’s right to his or her
168 Council of Eur. Comm’n Human Rights, Human Rights and Gender Identity, Doc.
No. CommDH/IssuePaper(2009)2, at 7 (July 29, 2009).
169
For general challenges, see Shannon Price Minter, Transgender Family Law, 56
FAM. CT. REV. 410 (2018); see also, Katherine A. Kuvalanka et al., An Exploratory Study
of Custody Challenges Experienced by Affirming Mothers of Transgender and GenderNonconforming Children, 57 FAM. CT. REV. 54, 56 (2019) (examining how courts have
taken custody away from parents who support the child’s gender identity)
170 Advisory Opinion AO-24/17, supra note 7, ¶ 90.
171 Id. ¶ 93.
172 Id. ¶ 101.f.
173 See Emma Inch, Changing Minds: The Psycho-Pathologization of Trans People,
45 INT’L J. OF MENTAL HEALTH 193, 193–204 (2016) (discussing how pathologization of
trans people has been extremely harmful).
174 Advisory Opinion AO-24/17, supra note 7, ¶ 130; INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 167, ¶ 419.
175
Id.
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legal name.176 These processes, according to the IACtHR, must be
based exclusively on the free and informed consent of the person
who requests the change of their legal name.177 The IACtHR also
stated that these procedures should be expeditious and, if possible,
free of charge.178
The IACtHR also referred to child’s right to change their legal
name to match their gender identity.179 Consistent with its case law,
the Court stated that children are entitled to the same rights as adults
under the ACHR.180 The Court stated that children have a right to
progressive autonomy, and that all children’s rights must be
protected by using the best interest of the child as a paramount
consideration.181 The IACtHR understands the role that parents play
in the development of children. The legal system, however, must
respect the progressive autonomy of children and promote judicial
bypass mechanisms when parents disagree with their child’s desire
to change her legal name.182
Prior to AO-24/17, Costa Rican law categorically did not allow
legal name changes based on gender identity.183 According to civil
society organizations, transgender individuals are systematically
mistreated and discriminated against when attempting to change
their legal names.184 Soon after the AO was issued, the Supreme

176 Advisory Opinion AO-24/17, supra note 7, ¶ 115; see INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 167, at 270.
177 See Advisory Opinion AO-24/17, supra note 7, ¶ 127; see INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 167, at 270.
178 See Advisory Opinion AO-24/17, supra note 7, at 62; see INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 167, at 272.
179 Advisory Opinion AO-24/17, supra note 7, at 64–68; see INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 167, at 279–80.
180 Advisory Opinion AO-24/17, supra note 7, ¶ 149; see Rights and Guarantees of
Children in the Context of Migration and/or in Need of International Protection, Advisory
Opinion OC-21/14, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 21, ¶ 66 (Aug. 19, 2014).
181 Advisory Opinion AO-24/17, supra note 7, ¶ 154.
182 Id. ¶ 156.
183 See OUTRIGHT ACTION INTERNATIONAL ET AL., MAPPING TRANS RIGHTS IN
COLOMBIA
1,
11
n.19
(2016),
available
at
https://www.outrightinternational.org/sites/default/files/TransRpt_Colombia_En.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J9H5-PX5C].
184 See Fabiola Pomareda, Transgender Costa Ricans Fight Discrimination Over
Name-Change
Rights,
TICO
TIMES
(Sept.
6,
2014),
http://www.ticotimes.net/2014/09/06/transgender-costa-ricans-fight-discrimination-overname-change-rights [https://perma.cc/8Z4J-3P7D].
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Tribunal of Elections (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones),185 in
charge of regulating the Identification Registry, informed Costa
Ricans that they would have access to an easy administrative
process for the change of a legal name.186 In less than a year after
the release of the AO, more than 300 people had changed their legal
name to coincide with their gender identity.187
2. Same-Sex Families: From Patrimonial Rights to Full
Recognition
The last two questions Costa Rica issued to the IACtHR related
to the recognition of patrimonial rights derived from same-sex
relations.188 The IACtHR pointed out that Costa Rica had not
specified the type of same-sex relations that it was aiming to protect
through its questions, so the Court took the opportunity to reinforce
the recognition by the ACHR of non-heterosexual relationships.189
It stated, “in general terms, the rights derived from affective
relations between couples, are usually subject to and protected by
the Convention through the institute of the family and family
life.”190
Even though the questions were specific to property rights, the
IACtHR considered that it could not answer without elaborating on
“whether affectionate relations between individuals of the same sex
could be considered as ‘family’ in the terms of the Convention.”191
This section of the AO-24/17 refers several times to Atala,192
however, that decision did not establish a specific concept of the
family. This was the opportunity for the IACtHR to expand on the
family as a concept that changes throughout time.193 The Court used
an unfortunate example to illustrate this evolution by referring to
the differentiated treatment of legitimate and illegitimate

185 See Jess Márquez Gaspar, The Advisory Opinion in Costa Rica, Almost One Year
Later, INTO (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.intomore.com/impact/the-advisory-opinion-incosta-rica-almost-one-year-later [https://perma.cc/YG44-J9U3].
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Advisory Opinion AO-24/17, supra note 7, at 3–5.
189 Id. ¶ 173.
190 Id.
191 Id. ¶ 175.
192 Id. ¶¶ 173–174.
193 Advisory Opinion AO-24/17, supra note 7, ¶ 177.
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children,194 a distinction that the Inter-American system has rejected
since its origins.195 The IACtHR gave a better example, citing a
prior Advisory Opinion on the rights of migrant children.196 It stated
that families can include not only parents and children but also the
extended family and individuals who care for children without
having biological ties. 197 This statement recognizes the reality of
Latin America, a region in which marriage has been scattered and
families are socially conceived in more complex and porous ways
than what legal systems usually recognize.198
The IACtHR explained the meaning of Article 17.2 of the
ACHR refers to the right of a man and a woman to get married and
have a family.199 It stated that such definition “would not be
formulating a restrictive definition of how marriage must be
understood or how a family must be founded. For this Court, Article
17.2 would only be establishing an expressed conventional
protection of one particular form of marriage.”200 For the Court
“this would not necessarily mean this may be the only type of family
protected by the American Convention.”201
The IACtHR used this Opinion to set specific guidance for
future decisions on family associations. It started with an analysis
of the type of protections that would be acceptable under the ACHR,
and ended with a very specific statement that anything short of
marriage equality would be unacceptable under the ACHR.202 First,
The IACtHR stated that the ACHR required countries to recognize
families formed by same-sex couples.203 The Court could have
ended its analysis here and encouraged countries to provide equal
protection and rights to married and unmarried families. Instead,
See id.
See id. at Part I, Sections B, C.1.
196
Advisory Opinion AO-24/17, supra note 7, ¶ 178 (citing Rights and Guarantees of
Children in the Context of Migration and/or in Need of International Protection, Advisory
Opinion OC-21/14, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 21, ¶ 66 (Aug. 19, 2014)).
197 Id.
198 See Albert Esteve & Elizabeth Florez-Paredes, Families in Latin America
Dimensions, Diverging Trends, and Paradoxes, in UNEQUAL FAMILY LIVES: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES IN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS 40–64 (Naomi R. Cahn et al. eds., 2018).
199 Advisory Opinion AO-24/17, supra note 7, ¶ 182.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 See id. ¶ 197 and ¶ 224.
203 See id. ¶ 199.
194
195
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the Court analyzed the status of marriage and other models of
formal recognition of same-sex couples around the region. It
concluded that extending marriage to same-sex couples would be
the simplest and most efficient way of ensuring rights to same-sex
couples.204 From that conclusion, the Court goes on to state that it
would actually be discriminatory to deny the protection of marriage
to same-sex couples.205 Furthermore, the Court stated that countries
must change their regulations and expand the right to marriage to
same-sex couples.206 In the meantime, the IACtHR stated, as a
transitory measure same-sex couples who don’t have access to legal
marriage should be afforded the same rights of married couples.207
3. The Role of Advisory Opinions and the Impact of AO24/17 in Latin America: A Word of Caution
Article 64.1 of the ACHR states that “member states of the
Organization may consult the Court regarding the interpretation of
this Convention or of other treaties concerning the protection of
human rights in the American states.”208 Advisory Opinions (AOs)
are “designed to assist states and organs to comply with and to apply
human rights treaties without subjecting them to the formalism and
the sanctions associated with the contentious judicial process.”209
The advisory role of the IACtHR can be very influential in allowing
the Court to provide general interpretations of international law.210
Though non-binding even for the country requesting the Court’s
opinion, AOs are a great source of consistency and uniformity in the
interpretation of the rights protected.211
In this case, with no obligation to do so, Costa Rica decided to
follow the guidance of the Court.212 Even though AOs trigger no

Advisory Opinion AO-24/17, supra note 7, ¶ 218.
205 Id. ¶ 224.
206 Id. ¶¶ 226, 228.
207 Id. ¶ 227.
208 ACHR, supra note 8, at art. 64.1.
209 Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) of American Convention on
Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, Inter.-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No.3, ¶ 43 (Sept.
8, 1983).
210
JO M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 37 (2013).
211
Id. at 48.
212 See Sofia C. Chinchilla & Esteban Oviedo, Gobierno reconocerá el matrimonio gay
al acatar en su totalidad criterio de Corte IDH, LA NACÍÓN (Jan. 9, 2018) (translation),
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legal obligations, the Supreme Court of Costa Rica interpreted the
Opinion as binding for Costa Rica.213 This was an important gain
for the government of Costa Rica, who requested the Opinion of the
Court while pushing for more protections for LGBTI individuals in
the country.214 The Opinion gave the government international
support to advance in this area.215
Despite its non-binding effect, once AO-24/17 was issued,
media outlets around the region announced that the IACtHR had
ordered all countries in the region to expand marriage to same-sex
couples.216 News outlets mentioned that the Court referred to trans
rights, but the talk of the town was marriage equality.217 The
opportunity to focus on trans adults and children’s rights was gone.
Marriage equality took all of the attention.
The Court’s Opinion was issued a few weeks before Costa
Rica’s presidential election.218 Until then, the electoral process was
moving with few controversies, with 13 candidates running to
become the frontrunners in a second round.219 Among the
candidates, an evangelical preacher had reached no more than 2%
of popularity among voters.220 The IACtHR’s AO, however,
https://translate.google.com/translate?sl=es&tl=en&u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nacion.c
om%2Fel-pais%2Fpolitica%2Fgobierno-aplicara-en-su-totalidad-criteriode%2FPPAZZRTUOBCV3NNZBR3SR5WBMY%2Fstory%2F [https://perma.cc/F3BBHTK5].
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Costa Rica pide opinión a CorteIDH sobre identidad de género y uniones gais,
CONTACTO HOY: EDICIÓN MUNDIAL (May 16, 2017), https://contactohoy.com.mx/costarica-pide-opinion-a-corteidh-sobre-identidad-de-genero-y-uniones-gais/
[https://perma.cc/V4D8-AX4M].
216 See, e.g., Chinchilla & Oviedo, supra note 212; see also Inter-American Human
Rights Court Backs same-sex marriage, BBC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-42633891
[https://perma.cc/LWH8CBFV] (“The judges said that governments ‘must recognize and guarantee all the rights
that are derived from a family bond between people of the same sex.’”).
217
See Sofia C. Chinchilla & Natasha Cambronero, Corte Interamerican Ordena
Abrir el Matrimonio Gay a Costa Rica, LA NACÍÓN (Jan. 9, 2018),
https://www.nacion.com/el-pais/politica/corte-interamericana-notifica-a-costarica/LRJBJF6DWNHOFGBXSDNIVYSEDA/story/
[https://perma.cc/4CKD-2AK5]
(referring to the trans rights portion of the AO in the second part of the note); see also BBC
NEWS, supra note 216 (mentioning the right of trans people to change their legal name).
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id.
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changed the course of the election and marriage equality became the
battlefield for deciding the presidential election.221 Fabricio
Alvarado, an evangelical preacher and singer, whose wife was also
an evangelical pastor, went from being a candidate with no chance
to win, to the frontrunner for the presidency on a platform that
rejected AO-24/17 and marriage equality.222 Fabricio Alvarado won
the majority in the first round of the presidential election with 24.7%
of the votes, followed by moderate center-left candidate Carlos
Alvarado with 21.74% of the votes.223 As part of his platform,
Fabricio Alvarado promised to call a referendum for the withdrawal
of Costa Rica from the Inter-American System of Human Rights.224
After weeks of tension, the country backed Carlos Alvarado, the
candidate who ran on a moderate political platform and respect for
human rights.225 Carlos Alvarado obtained more than 60% of the
popular vote, and Fabricio Alvarado captured 39.2% of the
ballots.226 As stated in The Washington Post, however, “Fabricio
Alvarado’s surprising rise highlighted the growing power of
socially conservative and evangelical voters in the small Central
American country.”227
Parallel to the backlash that AO 24/17 had on the Costa Rican
presidential election, Costa Rican courts were deciding challenges
to the Costa Rican legislation regarding marriage equality.228 The
221 Id. See also Gay Marriage Question Could Define Costa Rican Election, AP NEWS
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/35f59ca59a7d4e8892dc839a9674e863
[http://perma.cc/DZ8B-LQ99].
222 Costa Rica poll goes into runoff as evangelical leads, BBC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-42938510
[http://perma.cc/32VMNHEX].
223 Id.
224 Aarón Sequeira, Fabricio Alvarado sometería a referendo salida del
país de la Convención de Derechos Humanos, LA NACIÓN (Feb. 14, 2018),
https://www.nacion.com/el-pais/politica/fabricio-alvarado-someteria-a-referendo-salidadel/IUY2BX4RK5DCND3IV3C5JL2L7A/story/ [https://perma.cc/R2F3-KAKE].
225 Joshua Partlow, Costa Rican Voters Back Ruling-Party Candidate in Resounding
Snub to Foes of Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/presidential-race-in-costa-ricamay-hinge-on-same-sex-marriage/2018/04/01/c0f2acd6-7077-41fa-85208db24b723c9f_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.23427e12757c
[http://perma.cc/73CY-58CZ].
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Press Release, Org. of American States, IACHR Welcomes Supreme Court
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Supreme Tribunal of Elections sent the issue to the Constitutional
Chamber of the Costa Rican Supreme Court. On August 8, 2018,
the Supreme Court issued its first decision on marriage equality,
ordering Congress to regulate marriage equality within a timeframe
of 18 months.229 This is similar to the Constitutional Court of
Colombia’s 2016 decision that led to chaos on marriage regulation
for two years.230 The decision of the Costa Rican Supreme Court
relied on international human rights law, citing Atala231 and AO24/17.232 It declared both the lack of regulation on same-sex
marriage and lack of recognition of de facto same-sex couples
unconstitutional.233 However, the decision, similar to the IACtHR’s
AO 24/17, does not state that de facto couples should be entitled to
the same treatment and protection as married couples.
IV. Conclusion
Since its origins, the IASHR has focused on protecting the most
vulnerable groups. It advanced the protection of the non-traditional
families through the recognition of equality between children born
in and outside marriage. The drafters of the ACHR seem to have
had a broader idea of the family than the drafters of the ECHR and
the UDHR. The IASHR’s case law has strengthened the protection
of women’s rights, advanced gender equality and even mandated
countries to incorporate gender perspectives into their trainings for
judges and police forces. Likewise, the system has been at the
forefront of recognizing equality and family diversity based on
sexual orientation and gender identity through a strong and

Decision
on
Equal
Marriage
in
Costa
Rica
(Aug.
14,
2018),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2018/181.asp
[http://perma.cc/G5WJ-QNQY].
229 Id.
230 Sunnivie Brydum, Breaking: Marriage Equality Comes to Colombia, THE
ADVOCATE (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.advocate.com/world/2016/4/07/marriageequality-comes-colombia [http://perma.cc/QE3W-G6MK].
231 Supreme Court of Costa Rica, Constitutional Chamber, Resolution 12782, August
8, 2018, at 9, 30, 35 [hereinafter Resolution 12782], available at https://nexuspj.poderjudicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-875801 [https://perma.cc/8B2B-RF6R] (Atala Riffo
and Daughters v. Chile (Atala v. Chile), Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 239, (Feb. 24, 2012)).
232 Id. at 7, 9, 11, 21, 22, 26, 33, 35, 42 (citing Advisory Opinion AO-24/17, supra
note 7).
233 Id. at 42.

2019

FAMILY DIVERSITY

351

consistent jurisprudence that started with Atala234 and continued
with Duque v. Colombia235 and Flor Freire v. Ecuador.236 These
cases were based the protection of LGBT individuals on principles
of equality and non-discrimination, escaping the fate of a European
system that has struggled to move LGBT rights away from the right
to privacy, towards a recognition of family diversity through the
equality principle. AO 24/17 gave the IACtHR the opportunity to
analyze the right to equality of trans individuals and the rights of
same-sex couples.237 Human rights and LGBTI rights activists from
around the world have rightly welcomed AO-24/17. Its impact was
immediate, with Costa Rica altering its legal name change
regulations for trans individuals, and the Supreme Court issuing a
pro-marriage equality decision.238 At the same time, a strong focus
on marriage equality runs the risk of furthering the marginalization
of individuals who do not have access to marriage for reasons
unrelated to sexual orientation and gender identity. Discrimination
in housing, work, and health services may not change because samesex couples have access to marriage. More complicated yet, access
to marriage for same-sex couples does not create equality of
treatment for unmarried heterosexual and same-sex couples.
The Opinion’s strong focus on marriage equality runs two
important risks. On one hand, while it may have led to Costa Rica’s
marriage equality decision by Costa Rica’s Supreme Court, the
backlash almost led to a President ready to denounce the IASHR,
energizing anti LGBT activists in the region.239 At this time, it is
impossible to know the real political impact of this Opinion.
Second, as welcoming of marriage equality as the Opinion is as a
matter of principle, there is a risk for countries to use AO 24/17 to
maintain, if not to deepen, the difference of treatment between

Atala v. Chile, (ser. C), No. 239.
Duque v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 310 (Feb. 26, 2016) (Spanish only).
236 Flor Freire v. Ecuador, Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 315 (Aug. 31, 2016) (Spanish only).
237
Advisory Opinion AO-24/17, supra note 7.
238
Gaspar, supra note 185; Resolution 12782, supra note 231.
239 Ciara Nugent, How Far-Right Presidential Candidate Jair Bolsonaro Could
Transform Brazil, TIME (Oct. 25, 2018), http://time.com/5433379/brazil-bolsonaropolicies/ [http://perma.cc/2ZNY-M896] (stating that during Bolsonaro’s campaign he
signed an agreement with a Catholic voters’ association and committed himself to
defending traditional marriage).
234
235

352

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLIV

married and unmarried families. The more countries focus on
regulating marriage, the more the situation of the most vulnerable
families in the region remains untouched. Trans families, singleparent households, and de facto couples exist in parallel to married
families. All these groups are part of the family landscape of the
region. These groups become more relevant when statistics show
that marriage, both heterosexual and same-sex, is an institution
more prominent among middle and upper middle classes.240
The region needs more cases before the Inter-American system
to defeat regulations that still recognize men as heads of households
and regulations that leave unmarried families unprotected. The
region would benefit if the IACtHR would review cases that
recognize the functional family as protected by the ACHR. In Latin
America and the Caribbean, non-biological child caregivers lack
rights when compared with biological families.241
Equality within the family and recognition of family diversity
are among the most important contributions of the IASHR to
developing family frameworks in the region, and there is still much
space for growth in both areas. Just as the origins of the IASHR had
in mind the protection of illegitimate children as some of the most
vulnerable members of families, the new cases and reports must
keep identifying the most vulnerable members of the family at
different times and places.
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241 Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of
Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 438 (2008).

